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Geographical indicationThe aim of this article is to analyze how market actors, and farmers in particular, mobilize collective
coordination capacities to face global changes – market price or sectorial policies – within different regio-
nal contexts. A multi-scale conceptual framework is proposed to analyze market functioning and transfor-
mation over time and space.We extend Commons and Fligstein’s work onmarket institutions to deﬁne the
notion of competition regime as a combination of four market institutions that legitimizes competition
strategies.We alsomobilize Ostrom’swork on common property rights regimes to show that a competition
regime relies on the creation andmanagement of two systems of common-pool resources, namely innova-
tion capacity and reputation-building. This paper then shows the relevance of this framework through the
case study of the current restructuring of dairy supply chains inmountainous areas in France. It shows that
market liberalization strongly destabilizes the regional competition regimes that were based on the appro-
priation of social rights inherent to the national public policies. In the hybrid and speciﬁc competition
regimes, existing territorial coordination devices are not directly threatened and can support the develop-
ment of new cooperative strategies. In all cases, with the development of a contractual economy, farmers
are incited to develop or to strengthen coordination devices to become effective market participants.
Through the development of large territorial producers’ organizations capable of managing milk supply
in volume and quality, they would be able to take part in the management of the supply chains. To do
so, the present paper suggests that farmers’ organizations need material and immaterial investments
and assistance from regional public players to build new local collective capacities. The competition regime
framework is an asset for the design of such public supports in accordance with the principle of subsidiar-
ity, taking the regional speciﬁcity of the markets’ institutions and collective capacities into account.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
French and European dairy markets have been organized by a
speciﬁc Common Market Organization (CMO) regulation since
1968. CMO regulations concern public interventions in markets,
quotas and aid schemes, marketing and production standards,
and trade with countries outside the European Union (EU). Due
to the quota system implemented in 1984, the dairy industry
was less and later affected by the liberalization of the agricultural
policies initiated in 1992 within the framework of the WTO nego-
tiations. We consider 2008 as the year of change for the dairy sec-
tor since many major coordination instruments were destabilized
that year. First, limited tariffs were unable to prevent the impact
of the instability of international prices on industrial butter, cheeseand milk powder. Along with input price increases and together
with the economic crisis and stagnant European internal market
consumption, this led to a major crisis in the dairy sector. Second,
the quota constraint was gradually removed until its abolition
(planned for 2015), which constitutes a major change in dairy mar-
ket regulations (Bouamra-Mechemache et al., 2008; Chatellier and
Guyomard, 2009), and is expected to reduce farmers’ collective
bargaining power (Jongeneel et al., 2010). Third, the strengthening
of the European competition law since 2000 has restrained the col-
lective sectorial capacity to stabilize markets.
Despite the scale of the 2009 crisis, the European Parliament did
not preserve the quota system to restore market stability, but
instead adopted a ’’Milk Package’’ in 2012 that encourages thedevel-
opment of new stabilization strategies in a contractual economy. It,
in fact, provides a new framework for the establishment of written
contracts between farmers’ groups and processors, encourages the
formation of farmers’ groups with large territorial bases (up to 33%
of the national milk collection) and legitimizes interbranch
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may transfer theriskto theweaker linkof thechain,namelythe farm-
ers, especially when they are not collectively organized (Hueth and
Marcoul, 2003; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Jongeneel et al., 2010).
We propose the term ‘change of competition regime’ to analyze
this evolution. It results frommarket policymarket andpolicyaswell
as from structural changes, namely the internationalization of dairy
ﬁrmsasa resultofmergingandthedevelopmentofqualitystandards.
The French dairy industry is strongly affected by this change of
competition regime. First, vertical coordination and distribution of
added value are complex in France since dairy ﬁrms are numerous
and diverse and cooperatives process only 46% of the milk (CNIEL,
2012). As a result, the French Dairy Interbranch Organization
(CNIEL)1 plays a key role in balancing the power relationships along
the supply chains, notably through the provision of a framework for
setting milk prices. However, this interbranch agreement was pro-
hibited by the competition law in 2008, which complicated the crisis
exit. Second, the choices made in France regarding quota system
management were very limiting and structuring. The governance
of the quota instrument took place at the departmental2 level by
the administration and farmers’ main union. Milk quota exchanges
were blocked at this level. Thus, the quota policy was a coordination
framework for the collective management of the structuring of milk
production. It played a signiﬁcant role for 30 years by limiting the
concentration of milk production in the western part of France
(Institut de l’Elevage, 2009; Dervillé, 2012). In the new context,
farmers’ access to markets and stable prices are no longer granted
to historical quota holders. Competition is expected to increase
among producers and areas, and production is expected to concen-
trate in areas with comparative advantages for price competition
(Chatellier and Guyomard, 2009; Institut de l’Elevage, 2009). The
future of mountain dairy farming in France (22% of the producers
and 15% of the production in 2009) therefore seems compromised.
Nevertheless, in thenewcompetition regime, contractual regula-
tions substitute government regulations within the agri-food econ-
omy (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005;
Ponte andGibbon, 2005;Ménard andValceschini, 2005). In thedairy
industry, voluntary standards contribute to market segmentation
and may ensure the sustainability of speciﬁc production systems.
Labels legitimized by state or third party certiﬁcation enable con-
sumers to differentiate products according to their productionmode
(Hatanaka et al., 2005; Allaire, 2010; Deaton et al., 2010).
Mountain dairy supply chains that count numerous speciﬁc
quality products (Protected Geographical Indication3 cheeses) are1 The French Dairy Interbranch Organization (CNIEL), bringing together represen-
tatives from private industries, cooperatives and farmers, has played a key role in
balancing the power relationships along the supply chain. From its creation in 1969
until 2008, it developed the framework for the price setting modalities between dairy
ﬁrms and farmers (quality payment grid, price baseline and quality premium).
2 The department is an administrative division below the district level; there are 96
departments in France.
3 Protected Geographical Status (PGS) is a legal framework deﬁned by European
Union law to protect the names of regional foods. Protected Designation of Origin
(PDO), Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) and Traditional Speciality Guaranteed
(TSG) are distinct regimes of geographical indications (GI) within the framework. PDO
is the stricter regime: it covers agricultural products and foodstuffs which are
produced, processed and prepared in a given geographical area using recognized
know-how. PGI covers agricultural products and foodstuffs closely linked to the
geographical area (at least one of the stages of production, processing or preparation
takes place in the area). TGS is not a geographical indication stricto sensu.:
it highlights traditional character, either in the composition or means of production.
PDO, PGI and TSG are differentiated products that can satisfy a speciﬁc and
remunerative demand. The reputation and the potential of value addition are
collective goods. The PGS is based on a speciﬁc history and knowledge that is
embodied in publicly-acknowledged terms of reference. In France, it is managed at
the national level by the National Institute for Origin and Quality (INAO) under the
supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture. It has been granted by third party
certiﬁcation since 2008.particularly concerned. The ﬁrms and the governance structures that
manage collective labels develop different strategies to escape price
competition. They promote merging strategies as well as diversiﬁca-
tion strategies. For example, Lactalis, the leading French dairy ﬁrm,
takes part in the governance of 26 of the 36 French dairy Products
of Designation of Origin (PDO), owns over 40 private brands and is
engaged in an intensive international growth strategy.
In the present study, we are interested in the way the shift in
dairy market regulation (from state administration through the
quota system, to diverse contractual stabilization strategies) has
an impact on dairy farmers’ conditions to access markets. We con-
sider that in the new context, farmers’ competitiveness and sur-
vival are related not only to their ability to produce at low cost
but also to individually and collectively adjust to quality standards
and contractual regulations. Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that this ability
is related to collective innovative capacities that can vary spatially,
leading to different local adaptation capacities. Our second hypoth-
esis is that these capacities vary over time in response to the global
pressures for change, as well as in a proactive manner. Finally, we
develop an institutional framework of market functioning that is a
complement to the literature on the governance of value chains
(Gerefﬁ et al., 2005; Busch, 2011) by integrating the role of local
and national structures and institutions. By developing such a
framework, we aim at characterizing the processes through which
value is created and shared in various supply chains in contrasting
regional contexts, and the way it evolves over time.
In the next section, the concept of competition regime is devel-
oped as the keystone of the analysis, building on the concept of
intangible property (Commons, 1925), on Fligstein’s and Allaire’s
work on market institutions (Fligstein, 1996; Allaire, 2010), and
on the common property rights regime framework (Schlager and
Ostrom, 1992). We deﬁne it as the institutional arrangement of
coordination instruments at the origin of market stability. A com-
petition regime is a set of institutions that determines the bound-
aries of cooperation and competition domains and that frames the
capacity of economic players in terms of exchange. It includes
immaterial common resource systems and a property rights
regime.
This institutional framework is tested in the third section
‘Analyzing the diversity of adaptation strategies to change in
mountainous areas in France’ based on an analysis of the restruc-
turing of the French dairy supply chains in mountainous areas.
Using this exploratory approach, the ways that coordination
instruments are collectively managed, contain competition and
condition adaptation strategies are analyzed. The empirical anal-
ysis consists of a characterization of individual and collective
actors’ strategies at various scales, based on an articulation of a
comparative analysis of three case studies and of a descriptive
statistical analysis. Contingent on the nature of collective coordi-
nation instruments mobilized by the economic players, we show
the spatial differentiation of a competition regime. Three regional
competition regimes are identiﬁed in mountainous areas: generic,
hybrid and speciﬁc.
The relevance of the common property rights regime framework
to analyze changes in farmers’ conditions to access markets over
time is then shown using an analysis of the quality turn undertaken
in the hybrid competition regime between 2006 and 2011.Conceptual framework
An institutional framework to analyze complex markets
When adopting an institutional framework, we consider: (i)
that competition is restrained by cooperation and relies on institu-
tions that deﬁne the realm of competitive strategies in different
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when market participants have stable behaviors and are provided
with coordination instruments that remain legitimate over time;
(iii) that change occurs as a consequence of social and economic
pressures on prevailing institutions; and (iv) that the adaptation
capacities of agents are of an institutional nature. We adopt
Commons’ concept of the institution as ‘‘collective action in control,
liberation and expansion of individual action’’ (Commons, 1931). In
this perspective, ‘‘individuals are active persons associated with
others and participating in and controlled by the practices common
to all.’’ (Commons, 1925; p. 376). These practices, or working rules,
are both economic (repetition of behaviors) and political. They
were selected by the ‘‘common-law method of making the law by
the decision of disputes’’ (Commons, 1931; p. 651).4 By becoming
precedents, these practices secure expectations and provide statuses
for market participants and thus stabilize market functioning. Public
policy instruments are effective in that they orient, support and
provide legitimacy to different ways of entrepreneurship and to dif-
ferent forms of cooperation within market participants (Lascoumes
and Le-Galès, 2007).
Market structures, governing institutions and the speciﬁcity of French
dairy markets
Markets are social structures characterized by extensive social
relationships between ﬁrms, workers, suppliers, consumers and
governments. Institutions, necessary as preconditions to the exis-
tence of markets, ‘‘enable actors in markets to organize themselves,
to compete and cooperate, and to exchange’’ (Fligstein, 1996; p.
658). According to Fligstein (1996), the functioning ofmarkets relies
on the articulation of four market institutions: (1) property rights;
(2) governance structures; (3) conceptions of control; and (4) rules of
exchange. The proposed framework, enriched with Commons’ work
on intangible property, is developed in the following sub-sections
and applied to dairy markets to shed light on how they function.
Property rights
Property rights are social relations. While property is a conﬂict
of claims to whatever is scarce, rights of property are the concerted
action, which regulates the conﬂict (Commons, 1934; p. 303). ‘‘The
constitution of property rights is a continuous and contestable political
process’’ (Roe, 1994, quoted by Fligstein, 1996; p. 658). Commons
highlights that three forms of property have gradually emerged:
corporeal, incorporeal and intangible property. Corporeal property
refers to physical outputs of human activity. ‘‘Incorporeal property
is the legal enforcement of approved contracts; and intangible prop-
erty has come to be distinguished [. . .] as the purchasing power of
any and all property upon the markets [. . .] (Commons, 1925; p.
373). Purchasing power relates to an exchange value or, rather,
to a scarcity value. It results from a withholding right that has been
granted to a community. Intangible property ﬁrst developed when
markets and ﬁrms began to expand and when large social move-
ments of workers and of employers took shape and led to collective
agreements on wages and social provisions recognized by law.
Intangible property is ‘‘the right to continue in business or of access
to a labor market, whose present valuation depends on the expecta-
tions of quantities and prices to be derived from future transactions
under control of collective action’’ (Commons, 1934, p. 522). This
form of property was extended to farmers with the creation of4 A ‘‘conﬂict is transcended by applying a rule or custom that has been found to be good
in that it lies in the direction of what is believed at the time to be the common interest of
individuals and classes within the same group or society.’’ (Commons, 1925; p. 374).
They can be enforced by the government or by ‘‘economic organizations that are, at
times, more powerful than the collective action of the political concern, the state.’’
(Commons, 1931; p. 649).national agricultural policies in the 1930s and after the Second
World War. Agricultural policies, including the European Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), introduce instruments of price support
for domestic markets and of agricultural revenue stabilization,
deﬁning social status for producers at the same time. These
statuses provide access to speciﬁc earnings, including public
monetary payments, or grant market access (quotas), which can
be referred to as social rights (Allaire, 2013b).
Thus, the functioning of current milk markets is based on the
articulation of several property rights. Corporeal property rights
can be claimed based on the physical composition of milk. A
minority of farmers, in the case of direct sales, uses a private brand
(incorporeal property). Yet, in most cases, while constituting a pri-
vate incorporeal right, access to a particular market and its beneﬁt
(premium) depend on collective action. The possibility of control-
ling future incomes is conditioned by the capacity to differentiate
markets and to adjust supply to demand. Collective brands and
labels – including PDOs – can play this role, becoming intangible
assets. Even on generic markets, farmers with production rights
(quotas) have intangible property assets. At the industry level,
intangible property entails contractual regulation. As a result, with
this approach, dairy markets appear as multi-scaled intangible col-
lective resource systems, variously implemented in regional dairy
systems. If consistent, such a property rights regime aims to ensure
stability, allowing economic calculation. However, opportunism as
well as social critique and price competition are always present in
coordination schemes. The successive reforms of the CAP corre-
spond to a transformation of the social value behind public agricul-
ture supports, which reframes the intangible resource system
(collective assets and beneﬁciaries). The change over time of the
institutions at the origin of intangible property regimes leads to
a transformation of what we refer to as a competition regime.Governance structures
‘‘Governance structures refer to the general rules in a society that
deﬁne relations of competition, cooperation, and market-speciﬁc deﬁ-
nitions of how production and distribution should be organized’’
(Fligstein, 1996; p. 658). These rules extend beyond competition
laws and are effective by de facto rules that ‘‘are embedded in
existing organizations as routines and are available to actors in other
organizations’’ (Fligstein, 1996; p. 660). All the ways by which de
facto rules spread in an economy ‘‘are key issues in the process
of change and of stabilization of markets’’ (Allaire, 2010; p. 170).
Market-speciﬁc governance structures ensure: (i) market seg-
mentation through quality deﬁnition and control bodies; (ii) coor-
dination efﬁciency through information systems; and (iii) a market
identity supported by narratives related to products and qualities.
In other words, they concern the management of collective
intangible resource systems. Governance structures extend within
several governmental scales.
In France, the French Dairy Interbranch Organization (CNIEL)
plays an effective role at the national and regional levels. Estab-
lished in 1969 at the regional level to implement quality-based
payment systems, it brings together representatives of farmers,
cooperatives and private processing ﬁrms. It became a national
body in 1974 and acquired the right to enforce decisions taken
by its members. It manages (i) quality issues related to milk and
dairy products, (ii) the promotion of dairy products, and (iii) the
modalities of establishing milk prices (since 1997).5 Regional dairy5 The milk price agreement provides guidelines for the economic players to set milk
prices based on raw milk quality and on its valorization into dairy products. The level
of valorization is lower when industrial products are processed (30% of the milk
collected in 2008). It is acknowledged by economic players to be the highest in the
cheese and fresh product markets in the period of observation. Other consumption
goods bring in intermediary prices.
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the quality payment grid to the speciﬁcities of the production area.
PDO organizations are other governance structures that contribute
to the functioning of speciﬁc markets.Conceptions of control (quality conceptions)
Conceptions of control refer to the fact that perceptions of how
a market works and how goods are identiﬁed shape market func-
tioning. ‘‘They allow actors to interpret their world, make expecta-
tions, and act to control situations’’ (Fligstein, 1996; p. 658). As
market-speciﬁc institutions, established conceptions of control
are available knowledge, effective in governance structures. They
reﬂect long-term collective experiences (Allaire, 2013a). They are
similar to quality conventions (Favereau et al., 2002).
In the dairy market, the conception of control refers to dairy
farm and ﬁrm production and business models. The development
of the dairy industry in the 1960s was largely framed by an indus-
trial conception of control, even if alternative production systems
such as PDO or grassland farming developed in marginal areas such
as mountains. Minimum quality standards for raw milk and a few
basic dairy products were deﬁned by national regulations and pro-
cessing ﬁrms. The organization of the supply chain was subject to
the logic of standardization and economies of scale. Guaranteed
stable prices for industrial butter and milk powder secured invest-
ments to intensify production. The overproduction crisis of the
1980s and food scares of the 1990s led to a quality turn in the con-
ception of control (Allaire, 2002, 2010; Parrott et al., 2002). Quality
took precedence over prices in the purchasing choices of a growing
number of consumers. Consumption practices diversiﬁed with two
main consequences: competition on a variety of attributes
(Lancaster, 1991), including immaterial (identity-based) (Allaire,
2002, 2013a), and an opportunity for the development of alterna-
tive supply chains. Identity-based quality supported by speciﬁc
quality policies and certiﬁcation systems includes the production
system that made its development possible. Studies mobilizing
the economic theory of conventions have put forth that this quality
turn in alternative food market has gone along with a change in the
hierarchy of ‘orders of worth’ legitimizing stakeholders’ actions:
‘domestic order’, in which value is justiﬁed by local embeddedness,
and ‘civic order’, that puts the citizen welfare as the main evalua-
tion criterion, take over the ‘industrial order’ stressing efﬁciency
(Marescotti, 2000; Parrott et al., 2002; Ponte and Gibbon, 2005).
Nevertheless in most cases, orders of worth are hybridized. Our
statistical analysis6 has shown that in the French dairy sector, this
turn corresponds to PDO products (accounting for 10% of the produc-
tion and 30% in mountainous areas), organic farming (accounting for
only 1.2% in France in 2010, but with a fourfold increase of the
demand between 2001 and 2011) (CNIEL, 2011), farmhouse products
(1.4% of the production but 18% in mountainous areas, and a 10%
increase between 1999 and 2009).Rules of exchange
‘‘Rules of exchange deﬁne who can transact with whom and the
conditions under which transactions are carried out’’ (Fligstein,
1996; p. 658). They separate markets differently than quality
standards do. Rules of exchange are established by governments
and multilateral agreements.
They refer to the European trade and competition laws, as well
as to the dairy policy and its national implementation. Since the
creation of the European dairy policy (market intervention mecha-
nism, bottom prices, export subsidies and the quota system), pub-
lic authorities have contributed to the separation between national
and international markets. By establishing the status of market6 See Materials and methods section.participants, they condition their access to intangible property
rights, including social rights, and, more generally, to dairy mar-
kets. These rules have played a crucial role in the framing of collec-
tive resources, allowing economic players to compete, cooperate
and exchange within markets. They have supported generic inno-
vation strategies through the funding of agricultural research and
extension activities and the securing of milk prices, supporting
the spreading of an industrial conception of control.
The quality turn in the 1980s challenged these rules, calling for
more ﬁrm or territory-speciﬁc contractual arrangements. The
development of quality standards in combination with the spread
of speciﬁc quality conventions, has had a strong impact on the
structure and modus operandi of the supply chains for agricultural
and food products (Allaire, 2002; Henson and Reardon, 2005). Qual-
ity and traceability systems are now at the heart of the supply chain
relationships (Opara, 2003; Banterle and Stranieri, 2008). Public
players take part in the development of these new rules of exchange
by providing a framework for the development and enforcement of
standards. For example, progressive recognition of the geographical
indication systems (GI) at the European level and then within WTO
agreements has made the extension of speciﬁc food markets possi-
ble. However, private retail and processing standards have devel-
oped even faster. The development of private standards, together
with the globalization of the ﬁrms and the spread of third party cer-
tiﬁcation, has lead to a privatization and a downstream movement
of the governance of global value chains (Busch, 2011).
In French dairy markets, the role of retailers has been moder-
ated so far by the well-established role of processing ﬁrms. Retail-
ers play a role in the supply chain since they are the outlets for 96%
of consumer dairy products and because 35–50% of these products
are sold under retail brands (CNIEL, 2006). However, they deal
directly with dairy ﬁrms and are not part of the interbranch orga-
nization. This is in accordance with observations made in the con-
text of market liberalization in Eastern European countries (Dries
et al., 2009): when dairy industries are well established, retail
investments play a limited role in driving the changes throughout
the dairy chains. In addition, in the French context, the quota sys-
tem contributed to the balanced management of the supply chain
since market access is granted to all quota holders. For these two
reasons, to analyze the change in dairy market functioning, we
mainly focus on the relationships between farmers, dairy ﬁrms,
their representative groups and public players.
To sum up, the characterization of the four market institutions
at various geographical scales made it possible to develop an initial
understanding of the functioning of French dairy markets. In Euro-
pean dairy markets, the quota system and the market intervention
mechanism (Rules of Exchange), creating scarcity upstream and
downstream, contribute to sustaining prices above a bottom price
(Intangible Property Rights). Their instrumentation through pri-
vate and collective players at various scales (Governance Struc-
tures) have made it possible to shape production models and to
deﬁne available competition strategies (Conception of Control). In
the French context, the CNIEL has harmonized price-setting modal-
ities, and the management of the quota system at the departmental
level has sustained the preservation of production over a variety of
pedo-climatic and socio-economic contexts (Chatellier and
Guyomard, 2009; Dervillé, 2012), leading to a regional differentia-
tion of governance structures and conceptions of control. In
addition, in certain regions, we show that speciﬁc market
institutions have been created in relation to the development of
PDO supply chains. Competition regimes vary across regions.
Coordination resources and regional competition regimes
The meaning of ‘‘region’’ is ﬂexible. It corresponds to the inter-
mediary (infra-national) level of the supply chains and market
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departments to the ninedairy production areas7 in France. The regio-
nal organization of the supply chain has changed over time with the
merging of dairy ﬁrms and the spread of the intensive dairy farm pro-
ductionmodel. However, a regional organization remains. Depending
on the region, business models, markets, governance structures and
conceptions of control differ. Regional economic players, including
farmers, beneﬁt from speciﬁc conditions to access the market. Regio-
nal production systems correspond to different competition regimes.
Competition strategies, collective capacities and regional competition
regimes
There are two ways to escape price competition: integration
and diversiﬁcation (Fligstein, 1996; Allaire, 2010). Both concern
private and collective strategies. Integration does not consist only
of the merging of productive units. It can also take collective forms
such as contract setting within value chains, marketing co-opera-
tives, which are common at the primary stage of agricultural mar-
kets, and all forms of ‘‘hybrid governance structures’’, according to
the term used in transaction cost theory (Ménard, 2004). Above all,
integration and diversiﬁcation strategies are innovation processes
that engage collective and public resources. They require the build-
ing of market facilities and coordination instruments (Allaire,
2013b). Coordination instruments correspond to public instru-
ments and collective structures such as profession, interbranch
organizations, quality standards and the organizations that estab-
lish them. Whether they are small or big ﬁrms, economic actors
are therefore not just confronted with the issue of defending their
position against competitors. During transition phases, they are
engaged in negotiations with public and economic players, for
the purpose of pooling resources and developing coordination
instruments that stabilize markets. These instruments are multi-
level. Locally available competition strategies thus rely on local
collective capacities in terms of cooperation, as well as on the glo-
bal institutional context that legitimizes the status of economic
players and the conceptions of control, and that grants the func-
tioning of the governance structures. Considering the complemen-
tarity between competition and cooperation in markets and the
multi-level dimension of market institutions, we deﬁne here a
competition regime as a stable combination of the four above-
mentioned market institutions (Conception of Control, Structure
of Governance, Property Rights and Rules of Exchange). Regional
competition regimes and global competition regimes are in inter-
action: on the one hand, the global institutional context shapes
the available regional competition strategies, whereas on the other
hand, collective local rules can be recognized as legitimate and
thus transform the global institutional framework over time.
Common-Pool Resources (CPR) and common intangible property
regimes
Regional competition regimes result from the creation, pooling
and management of collective resources. These resources are
essentially intangible. In the framework developed, regional inno-
vation strategies, business models, standards and governance
structures are collective working rules that have been developed
by market actors and that they agree to adhere to in order to
beneﬁt from a stable environment.
Ostrom and her colleagues proposed an analytical framework
that recognizes the role played by the beneﬁciaries in the building
of the rules that organize the access to and determine the form of
the sustainable management of the common resources (McGinnis,7 The nine production areas were jointly developed by the public and the private
interbranch organizations to facilitate the adaptation to the end of the quota system.
Since their creation by decree in 2011, they are the new scale of management of the
quota.2011). The ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, 1968) threatens col-
lective systems in cases of institutional failures or non-operating
rules. The governance of the commons combines de jure and de
facto rules. This framework was ﬁrst applied to natural resources
and extended to intellectual commons (Hess and Ostrom, 2003;
Frischmann, 2013), and to the cultural or intellectual environment
of productive and marketing activities (Allaire, 2013b). Ostrom’s
works revealed the many different ways that government, market
and community institutions depend on each other to successfully
manage common-pool resources. Accounting for the multi-level
and multi-stakeholder features of the governance of common
resources, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) proposed a characterization
of common property regimes by identifying ﬁve types of rights and
statuses for the right holders: access and withdrawal, both
characterizing authorized users; right of management attached to
claimants; the right of exclusion attached to proprietors; and the
right of alienation that deﬁnes the owners.
Access and withdrawal rights are deﬁned by operational rules
and can be modiﬁed by collective action. Management, exclusion
and alienation rights result from collective choice rules, which con-
trol the operational rules, e.g., by deﬁning who can participate in
changing operational rules and the level of consensus that is
required. All of these rights may be held by single individuals or
by collectives. However, more than a social hierarchy, the distribu-
tion of the different rights reﬂects the governance structures and
stakeholders’ power. Hess and Ostrom (2003) show that full own-
ership is not necessary for the efﬁciency of the resource use.
Regarding knowledge commons, they even stress that the right
of alienation generally cannot exist. The rights of management of
the system and the rights of exclusion provide sufﬁcient incentives
to efﬁciently manage the pooled resources. The resource units
ﬂowing from the common resource system (meaning the service
the users can obtain) depend, in terms of quantity and quality,
on the system management.
We extend this framework here to collective innovation and
bargaining capacities that support market segmentation and sta-
bilization processes. In this case of common property for market
speciﬁc assets, we deﬁne, by homology, four bundles of rights as
follows:
 the rights to access speciﬁc markets and to withdraw speciﬁc
resources; i.e. to produce speciﬁc products or services and to
beneﬁt from stable prices (authorized producers),
 the rights to deﬁne or modify speciﬁc standards (claimants),
 the rights to select and exclude market participants
(proprietors),
 the rights (at least the possibility) to end a market differentia-
tion strategy or to transmit it to another community (owners).
In our opinion, two systems of common-pool resources are
crucial to analyze market stabilization and differentiation pro-
cesses: knowledge and governance structures (at the basis of an
innovation capacity) and collective reputation (at the source of a
stable market premium), hereafter referred to as ‘Innovation
resource system’ and ‘Reputation resource system’ (Table 1).
The ﬁrst common (or collective resource system) is made up of
all the collective structures that contribute to the development of
productive and market solutions. What is common is the knowl-
edge dimension. The innovative capacity of a group depends on
its capacity to collect and process information in its domain of
action. The ﬂux (beneﬁt) of the resource system consists of solu-
tions: improvement of productive models, innovation supports
and collective competency building, relations with local and
regional authorities, etc. Withdrawal units are speciﬁc skills that
community members have access to. Management refers to the
right to take part in research and training planning. The rights of
Table 1
Regional competition regime: a set of two systems of common-pool resources.
Innovation resource
system
Reputation
resource system
Access and
Withdrawal
Speciﬁc skills and
innovative solutions
Market premium and
price stability
Management Research and extension
planning
Value-added sharing rules
Exclusion Products & enterprises
concerned by the innovation
process
Speciﬁc code of practices
Alienation Innovation strategy Market segment
8 Mountainous areas are deﬁned by article 18 of EC regulation n 1257/1999.
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enterprises that will beneﬁt from the innovation strategy. Who
holds this right is not clear. It is the result of the form of relation
(or mode of coordination) in the regional production system.
Although this whole resource system has no owner, it may be
threatened with complete destruction as a result of social crises.
The second common at stake is the collective reputation, which
is a collective asset and may concern a group, a product or an area.
The ﬂux (withdrawal) is an increase of bargaining power or a price
premium. The management regards rules leading to value addition
sharing. The exclusion rights deﬁne who will be able to beneﬁt
from the reputation in the future. They are based on contractual
speciﬁcations (area, plant or breed, agronomic or processing
practices, etc.). One way to preserve the collective reputation is,
in fact, to control individual innovation.
In the case of dairy market segmentation and stabilization pro-
cesses, the collective intangible resource system depends on the
structuring of the industry, on the level of farm specialization, on
the active producers’ and stakeholders’ associations, on the way
public instruments are implemented and on past market struggles
and social experiences. In most places in France, conceptions of
control are intensive and industrial as a result of the modernization
policies of the 1960s. Regulatory bodies bring together administra-
tive and professional actors who play the role of proprietors, e.g.,
the farm structure commission in charge of the quota attribution
(CDOA), the regional interbranch organization, the Chamber of
Agriculture. In certain regions though, a speciﬁc production system
identity can be observed when a particular conception of control
shapes the productive models of farms and ﬁrms and builds the
reputation of the products. In this case, PDO or other collective
brand management organizations interact with the above-men-
tioned generic regulatory bodies.
In conclusion, we showed that the common intangible property
rights regime framework is complementary to the analysis in
terms of market institutions. While the latter describes the modal-
ities of cooperation, exchange and competition, the common intan-
gible property rights regime framework makes it possible to
identify the actors who developed the different type of rules, are
accountable for them and who beneﬁt from the intangible property
rights created. The combination of the two frameworks we pro-
posed is expected to allow an analysis of the social constructs
underlying value creation processes and their components (inno-
vation capacity and reputation-building). Deﬁned as such, the con-
cept of competition regime is expected to add to the literature on
supply chain governance by taking the role of horizontal coordina-
tion and public policies into account, together with the role of
vertical coordination. To validate the operational value of this
framework, we now use it to analyze the restructuring of dairy
markets in mountainous areas in France. We focus on the diversity
of the competition regime over space and time. Considering the
diversity of the prevailing supply chains and the pressures for
change, we analyze the actors’ responses and the collective
capacities at work.Analyzing the diversity of adaptation strategies to change in
mountainous areas in France
To test the relevance of the competition regime framework, we
mobilize it in this section to highlight the regional diversity of
coordination devices prior to 2008 and the consecutive contrasting
exposure and adaptation capacities to the withdrawal of the public
authorities from the stabilization process of the dairy markets.Materials and methods
Data mobilized and processing
The empirical analysis is based on the combination of ﬁeld sur-
veys and dataset analysis (Dervillé, 2012). First, ﬁeld surveys were
conducted with various actors from the dairy industry (ﬁrms and
institutional players) at the national level (10 interviews) and in
three case studies (36 interviews) between 2008 and 2011.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the actors to
develop an understanding, on the one hand, of the functioning of
the organization, the resources mobilized (including coordination
instruments), the projects and difﬁculties and, on the other hand,
of the perception of the change of competition regime and the cor-
related private and collective issues (adapted innovation strategies
to be developed, tensions among actors regarding these strategies
and the means required). Second, the statistical analysis was used
to characterize the diversity of business models (farms and ﬁrms)
and supply chain conﬁgurations, as well as the heterogeneity of
their environment. Highly exhaustive datasets devoted to dairy
farm, dairy industry and natural and socio-economic context data
were connected to each other (Table 2).
All data were geo-located at the municipal level (‘‘commune’’,
36,679 units in France, mean area = 1,550 km2). These datasets
were used to calculate indicators aimed at characterizing the spa-
tial diversity of dairy farm and ﬁrm production and business mod-
els, as well as their socio-economic environment. Aggregation took
place at threemain scales: ﬁrm, municipality and department. Data
from all these datasets were processed using MySQL software
(MySQL, version 5.0, Oracle Corp., Redwood City, CA, USA). Mapping
was conducted using the ODR platform (www.http://esrcarto.sup-
agro.inra.fr/). Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all indicators used to
characterize the French dairy sector and its speciﬁc conﬁguration
in the three case studies were calculated based on these datasets.The scope of the analysis
The French dairy industry encompasses the production of 24
billion liters of cow milk by 81,813 quota holders (source: FAM,
2009), its collection and processing by 782 dairy establishments
for a turnover of 23 billion euros (source: YDI, 2006). However,
the six major ﬁrms process more than 50% of the milk collected.
In 2006, 38% of the milk was processed into cheeses, 25% into but-
ter and cream, 18% into various types of powder, 11% into milk and
7% into fresh products. Approximately 28% of these processed
products were sold to industries for further processing. Seventeen
percent of the turnover corresponded to exported products, mainly
in the form of cheeses and towards the EU (48% and 80%,
respectively).
The indicators calculated on the basis of the combination of the
eight datasets made it possible to shed light on the diversity of the
French dairy industry (Dervillé and Allaire, 2014). Based on the
farm and ﬁrm production models and milk density, three main
areas can be distinguished: specialized plain areas generally
located in the northwestern part of France, mixed farming areas
with light milk density, and mountainous areas.8 They account
Table 2
Datasets mobilized.
Dataset Indicators
Farm Quota Management Database (FAM) Years: 1999 and 2004 to 2010 Quota allotted each year: total in liters, share of direct sales,
quotas transfer among farmers
Legal status: individual or corporate farm
Business model: milk delivery or farm processing or both
Agricultural Social Mutuality (ASM) Years: 1999 to 2010 Human resources: age of the farm manager, number of
workers
Production model: main production system
(culture, dairy, poultry, etc.) in turnover;
Income
National Bovine Identiﬁcation Database (NBID) Years: 2005 to 2006 Production model: milk production, breeding, fattening,
specialized or mixed system
Herd management: age at ﬁrst calving, calving interval,
cow replacement rate, cow mortality rate
Records from French herds in the Milk Control Program (MCP) Years: 2005 to 2006 Member of MCP control (yes/no)
Lactation over 305 days (kg)
Somatic cells count (cells/liter of milk)
Dairy industry Yearly Dairy Inquiry (YDI) Years: 2000 and 2006a Production model: milk collection (yes/no),
processing (yes/no); type of dairy products and
quantity in kg.
Size: number of employees, milk collected (liters),
turnover (euros)
Business model: belonging to a group (yes/no),
export share (%)
National Institute for Quality (INAO) Years: 1980 to 2011 Yearly PDO production (kg)
Environment Quota Management Database (FAM) Milk density (liter/km2)
Farm density (farm number/10 km2)
Rural Development Observatory (RDO) Farmers with agro-environmental scheme (%)
Share of grassland within the overall agricultural land in
2000 (%)
a For the three case studies, industry data was updated in 2008 and 2011, with complementary data collected from surveys and reviews of the literature.
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mountain dairy industry was chosen as a case study because of its
severe exposure to the change of competition regime and its diver-
sity. Hampered by limited labor productivity, limited ﬂexibility
and high investment, production and collection costs, its mainte-
nance was widely due to the quota system and its management at
the departmental level (Institut de l’Elevage, 2009; Dervillé, 2012).
Nevertheless, depending on the choices made by economic players
over time (entrepreneurship models, markets targeted, position in
the French dairy industry, governance structure), the supply chain
structure and functioning are diverse and the resources available
to innovate, create value and adapt to change are contrasted, as
are the farmers capacities to access them.
The three mountainous departments considered are the Haute-
Loire (case study 1), the Cantal (case study 2) and the Doubs (case
study 3). The ﬁrst two are in the Massif Central (central France),
whereas the Doubs is part of the Jura Mountain (eastern France).
These three departments were chosen for their contrasting rela-
tionships with speciﬁc supply chains: absence of PDO in Case 1
and valorization of 60% and 100% of the milk in PDO cheeses in
Cases 2 and 3, respectively. In the last two cases, several PDO
cheeses are involved. However, in both of these cases, one cheese
is responsible for the largest volume and is the primary contributor
to the value chain functioning: Cantal and Comté cheeses,
respectively.
Spatial diversity of competition regimes in mountainous areas
Three contrasting supply chains
The three departments roughly accounted for 2000 producers
and 400 million liters of milk each in 2008. Farm size and the pro-
ﬁle of processing ﬁrms differ (Table 3). Average farm sizes and
labor productivity are below the national average of 211,000 liters
per worker in all three cases, but it is the highest in the Doubs
(Case 3). The Doubs beneﬁts from a positive investment dynamicthat supports farm growth and renewal (Institut de l’Elevage,
2009). In this case, production systems are grass-based, but pro-
ductivity per cow is relatively high for mountainous areas,
although still below the average for specialized plain areas (7,089
liters). In all three cases, processing units are smaller than the
one of the specialized plain areas where 66% of the units process
more than 20 millions liters. Nevertheless, they are much smaller,
less industrialized and territorial-based in the Doubs (Case 3). In
Cases 1 and 2, private nationwide ﬁrms or large supra-departmen-
tal cooperatives collect 90% of the milk. Moreover, the processing
capacity of the Haute-Loire (Case 1) is limited: one third of the milk
is sold on the spot market.
Three regional competition regimes
The conceptual ‘competition regime’ framework developed is
now mobilized and applied to specify the diversity of supply
chains. Using the quantitative data and the surveys conducted,
we show that the speciﬁc form taken by the four market institu-
tions explains the differences among the three regional production
systems (Table 4).
As far as the Conceptions of Control are concerned, the ﬁrst two
case studies of entrepreneurship models are mainly intensive and
industrial at the farm and processing levels, respectively. This is
the case for all the ﬁrms in the Haute-Loire (Case 1): the dairy pro-
duction developed after World War II beneﬁted from the market
stabilization policy and from the intensive technical revolution
based on productive specialized breeds, grass and maize cultiva-
tion, silage and feeds. Private ﬁrms and cooperatives industrialized
milk processing. In the Cantal (Case 2), a diversity of systems coex-
ist: grass-based farming systems and local cooperatives inherited
from the PDO cheese processing tradition remain, but intensiﬁca-
tion and industrialization technologies have spread throughout
the department since the expansion of dairy production in the
1960s. Generic and speciﬁc supply chains are interrelated since
PDO speciﬁcations are limited. As shown for other PDO (Letablier
Table 3
Description of the supply chain in the three case studies.
Haute-Loire (Case study 1) Cantal (Case study 2) Doubs (Case study 3)
Production
Quota (millions of liters) 392 419 439
Number of farms 2293 2403 2039
Decline in farm number from 1999 to 2008 37% 32% 19%
Labor productivity (avg. quota in liter/worker) 169,140 174,392 185,919
Labor productivity (share of farms with less than 100,000 liters/worker) 28% 33% 6%
Production system (% of specialized dairy farms) 69% 53% 92%
Technologies used Intensiﬁcation (Silage, fodder
maize up to 1000 m high)
Grass-based farming system in
the northwest Intensiﬁcation
in the south
Mostly grass-based
Average milk production in 305 days in liters (Standard deviation) 5626 (1277) 5829 (1521) 6180 (869)
Milk collection
Volume (millions of liters) 364 367 488
Number of departmental collection units 6 24 111
Share of milk collected by small units (less than 100 millions liters) 41% 73% 100%
Share of milk collected by departmental units 35% 97% 98%
Share of milk sold on spot market 30% Negligible Negligible
Milk processing
Amount of milk processed (millions of liters) 254 337 425
Number of processing units 9 23 110
Share of units processing less than 5 millions liters 33% 48% 90%
Share of units processing more than 20 millions liters 33% 17% 4%
Share of processing units belonging to national ﬁrms 90% 75% 25%
Share of cheese (% of milk collected) 81% 96% 100%
Share of PDO (% of milk collected) 0% 60% 95%
Indicators calculated based on the combination of the above-mentioned exhaustive datasets.
Table 4
Market institutions of the three regional competition regimes.
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Fig. 1. Average yearly departmental milk prices in the three case studies (from Dervillé and Allaire, 2014; source: SMLAIT).
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economic players at production and processing scales is likely to
have contributed to this hybridizing of the conception of control.
In the Doubs (Case 3), dairy farms, cheese makers and cheese rip-
eners have put forth a speciﬁc conception of control (dominated by
domestic worth). Institutionalized in the PDO speciﬁcations, it has
impacted the entrepreneurship models until now. First, dairy
farms are grass-based and farmers have retained some control over
the downstream of the supply chain: they own 75% of the process-
ing ﬁrms and do not sell milk, but unreﬁned cheese instead. Sec-
ond, cheese-processing units are handicraft and small scale (40%
process less than 5 million liters a year in 2006). Third, regional
players still play a considerable role in the ripening and marketing
of cheese (45% of the market in 2008). Finally, leading national
processing ﬁrms invested in PDO processing in the 1990s, but
due to the PDO speciﬁcations and legitimacy of the PDO organiza-
tion, they adjusted to the local conception of control. As a result,
the power relationship among the economic players is relatively
well balanced in this third case.
Global Rules of Exchange, namely the European trade and com-
petition law, the dairy policy and their implementation at the
national level, apply to all production systems. The Geographical
Indication (GI) regulation applies for Cases 2 and 3, but is more
extensively mobilized in Case 3. At the local level, in Cases 1 and
2, milk exchange modalities are controlled by the departmental
implementation rules of the quota system, as well as by the inter-
branch milk price agreement. Market access is guaranteed through
the holding of a quota. Milk price is based on its composition (fat
and protein content as well as cleanliness), in a context of scarcity
organized by the quota system. In Case 3, who can take part in the
dairymarket is largely determined by PDO speciﬁcations. PDO spec-
iﬁcations concern milk production, as well as milk processing and
cheese ripening. They lead to a strong differentiation of the practices
and production models: zero silage, limited amount of concentrate
in the feed intake, obligation to process raw milk, size of the pro-
cessing unit limited by a milk collection radius of 25 km, control
of the ﬁrms andmarket growth based on the collectivemanagement
of casein tags.9 Speciﬁc rules of exchange and conception of control
are intertwined and reinforce each other. In Case 2, PDO speciﬁcations
existed until 2008, but were limited: there is no condition on milk
production except for the location, raw milk processing is not com-
pulsory and farmers have no idea of the fate of their milk.9 Tags are sold by the PDO organization and guarantee the identity of PDO cheeses.
The speciﬁcity in Case 3 is that tags have been turned into an access right to enter the
PDO market. Every year, based on the sales of the previous year and the amount of
cheeses available in storage, the PDO stakeholders establish a road map and decide
upon the amount of tags that will be delivered for the year. Tags are shared among
cheese processors according to historical references. Production beyond the quantity
targeted by the road map is theoretically feasible but, in fact, prevented by prohibitive
prices. This process, which has been successful in supporting the market growth and
reputation, is overseen by the government. It was presented to the European
Commission within the framework of the Milk Package.In the ﬁrst two cases, the local Governance Structures consist in
large part of an appropriation of the national coordination instru-
ments: milk quota transfers are under the control of the depart-
mental quota attribution commission, and raw milk sales are
ruled by the interbranch organization. In Case 2, the PDO organiza-
tion has a limited legitimacy among local players, and its capacity
to rule the PDO market is limited. Moreover, the PDO market
accounts for only 60% of the production. Speciﬁc resources exist
but they are barely activated. On the contrary, in Case 3, the PDO
organization is legitimate and beneﬁts from a signiﬁcant budget
(6 million euros) based on membership fees. It organizes the pro-
duction and distribution with several coordination instruments:
research programs, national and international promotion cam-
paigns, cheese production rights with the tag delivery policy and
the road map9, market monitoring and common price setting rules
(detailed in the following paragraph).
Regarding Intangible Property Rights, quota rent is guaranteed
to all quota holders as a result of the European dairy policy. Stan-
dard milk price is further negotiated in Cases 1 and 2 within the
national interbranch organization. The price recommendations
depend on the current marketing value of industrial products, con-
sumption goods and exports. In Case 3, the value addition and
sharing processes are totally different. Cheese sales are determi-
nant. Prices are derived from the value added through cheese sales.
Costs are collectively estimated at various stages of the supply
chains, and the prices of the different supply chain products (milk,
unripened cheese, ripened cheese) are set accordingly. They are
based on an internal evaluation of the contribution of the economic
players to the value addition process discussed yearly among
stakeholders. Quality premiums are attributed. Over the last
20 years, milk has brought in prices that are 20% higher than the
national average (Fig. 1).
Based on the conﬁguration of the market institutions, the com-
petition regimes can be qualiﬁed as generic, hybrid and speciﬁc for
the Haute-Loire (Case 1), the Cantal (Case 2) and the Doubs (Case
3), respectively. In Cases 1 and 2, the common-pool resources are
managed by national public and sectorial bodies. The quota system
and the interbranch organization are the main instruments that
restrain competition and ensure market stability. The production
models are largely industrialized and are based on technical pack-
ages developed and promoted at the national scale. The hold the
local players have on market functioning is limited to an appropri-
ation of these national coordination instruments. In Case 3, under
the Geographical Indication regulation, the local players have
developed speciﬁc coordination instruments (speciﬁc production
models, reputation and value-added rule sharing). Market func-
tioning in Case 2 is close to that of Case 1. However, despite the
industrialization process that took place both at the production
and processing levels, some speciﬁc PDO-related know-how and
reputation still remain.
To sum up, farmers’ conditions to access the market vary across
regions. With the analysis in terms of competition regime, we
Table 5
Common-Pool Resources and adaptation capacities.
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ble property rights dairy farmers can access vary depending on
the horizontal coordination devices established locally. The pro-
duction system can be more or less inclusive, and it is possible that
a region does not form a system with a speciﬁc identity. In such a
case, the reputation and the innovative capacity are sectorial more
than regional, as highlighted for the Haute-Loire (Case 1). The
quota system, at the origin of a stable milk price, and the develop-
ment and spread of intensive agricultural production models since
the 1950s falls under this category. On the contrary, when the gov-
ernance is more interbranch and regional, available competition
strategies rely on local arrangements. In the case of quality
schemes, a diversity of governance structures exists. In some cases,
it has a strong territorial anchorage with all the farmers and pro-
cessors taking part in the market building and beneﬁting from a
market premium (Case 3). In other cases, it is mostly industry-
based, the reputation and proﬁt being held mainly by the proces-
sors (Case 2). After demonstrating that the proposed framework
makes it possible to analyze value chains in space, we focus on
its usefulness to explain value chain transformation over time.
Coordination instruments under pressure: which adaptation strategies
in the three competition regimes?
In this subsection, we test the ability of the regional competi-
tion regime framework to shed light on a change in competition
regime over time. To do so, we analyze the impacts of the 2008/
2009 crisis. We show that the impact of market liberalization
and local adaptation strategies depends on the intangible resources
that sustain the market stabilization process (Table 5).
In the generic and hybrid regional competition regimes (Cases 1
and 2) where the market stability was largely based on an appro-
priation of the social rights related to the CAP, the impact of liber-
alization is the strongest. Dairy farmers suffered from the market
price volatility (Fig. 1) and from the weakening of the national
interbranch organization to exit the crisis. In Case 1, even theiraccess to the market was threatened since two of the main
ﬁrms accounting for 40% of departmental milk production went
bankrupt. In Case 3, the impact of the change of competition regime
is mitigated by the existence of speciﬁc coordination instruments
that continued to ensure market stability despite the crisis. Milk
price in Case 3 did not follow the general trend of 2008/2009, sug-
gesting that the market differentiation process is effective in this
case. To sum up, exposure to the change in global competition
regime is conditioned by the locally available resource systems.
Based on the regional collective resource systems, we now
show that the three regional competition regimes follow contrast-
ing development paths.
In the generic competition regime (Case 1), price competition
overrides cooperative solutions. Farmers’ unions asked the local
government to intervene to ensure the continuity of milk collec-
tion and to contribute to reinforcing the competitiveness of the
supply chain. Farm exit and growth are thus targeted. Market dif-
ferentiation strategies are explored as well. A collective brand,
‘‘Lait de Nos Montagnes’’ (‘‘Milk from Our Mountains’’) is being
developed. However, no production speciﬁcations (except for the
localization) support this marketing strategy, which reduces its
ability to constitute speciﬁc resource systems. This shows path
dependence: when the collective structures are under sectorial
corporatism, generic solutions and social rights are given priority.
In the speciﬁc competition regime (Case 3), the interviews
showed that the players work at reinforcing their differentiation
strategy. The players have adjusted their market control devices
to the new context. Cheese production rights that were linked to
the quotas are now based on the land owned by the farmers. In
view of the eventuality that some farmers may plan to increase
their milk production, PDO members are also investigating diversi-
ﬁcation opportunities for PDO raw milk outside of the PDO cheese
market in order to preserve its identity and value in the event of an
increase in milk production. The establishment of a fund to support
local players aims at protecting the identity of traditional small
businesses.
Table 6
Intangible property rights regime of the Cantal production system (hybrid competition regime). In the table ‘before 2008’, players, rules and rights associated to speciﬁc supply
chains ﬁgure in italic. In the table ‘after 2008’, new speciﬁc players, rules and rights ﬁgure in italic and bold.
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tions are also favored.
To sum up, based on the regional collective resource systems,
price competition or cooperative solutions through the develop-
ment and enforcement of quality standards may be favored. We
now use the intangible property rights regime framework to shed
light on the modalities used by the market participants to
strengthen market differentiation and stabilization strategies. To
do this, we analyze the quality turn undertaken in the hybrid com-
petition regime in the following section.
Change in the intangible property rights of the hybrid competition
regime: can dairy farmers’ conditions to access the market improve?
The aim of this section is to test the ability of the intangible
property rights regime framework to take the analysis of the
change in competition regime even further. The issue at stake is
not only to identify the change of coordination instruments and
consecutive available competition strategies, but also to character-
ize the underlying social processes and the consequences in terms
of rights and duties for the various market participants.
The Cantal department has a long tradition of PDO cheese pro-
duction. However, the survey showed that it mainly concerned the
northwestern part of the department, whereas milk production
developed in the south of the department as late as the 1970s. Gen-
eric and speciﬁc supply chains could have coexisted. However, the
choice was made by local leaders to adopt intensive and industrial
technologies throughout the department. Farmers’ unions had
more power than PDO organizations at the time, and PDO speciﬁ-
cations were weakened at all stages of the chain. PDO and generic
supply chains became interrelated and PDO processing became
increasingly large-scale and industrialized. Meanwhile, the com-
mon-pool resources related to cheese processing progressively lost
their speciﬁcity and became privatized. Limited collective action
was undertaken to improve the quality of the traditional cheeses
or to promote them. In addition, cheese making on the farm
declined and farmers’ cooperatives were gradually purchased by
private ﬁrms. Farmers lost control of the downstream side of the
chain. They limited their skills to milk production and, to do so,
generally applied intensive generic techniques. Farmers did not
know whether their milk would be processed into PDO cheese or
not.
Until 2008, the innovative strategy of the department was
mainly generic and sectorial, and speciﬁc resources were not taken
advantage of. Dairy farmers had access to generic skills. Through
their union, they had access to the management and exclusion
rights of the generic innovative strategy. Farmers have access to
a milk price established by the quota system and the interbranch
organization. They take part in the development of constitutional
rules relative to the generic reputation resource system through
their representation in the regional joint trade organization, as well
as in the departmental farm structure commission.
Due to a malfunctioning of the PDO organization, dairy farmers
are excluded from the management and beneﬁts of the ‘‘reputa-
tion’’ resource system. The PDO cheese reputation results from pri-
vate strategies of dairy ﬁrms. The decline in sales of 22% over the
last 20 years tends to show that the private management of the
PDO reputation has not been very successful. Firms have in fact
competed with each other rather than cooperating among them-
selves, leading to the high concentration of processing facilities
(82% of the PDO cheese processed by two ﬁrms in 2008). This anal-
ysis in terms of property regime is illustrated in Table 6, which
summarizes the rights and duties of the dairy farms, dairy ﬁrms
and collective bodies before 2008.
After 2008, the common-pool resource systems and the intangi-
ble property rights regime that sustain the hybrid competitionregime underwent major changes (Table 6, after 2008). First, the
power balance among the stakeholders and their respective con-
ception of control evolved with the perspective of the end of the
quota system. New requirements concerning farmers (extensiﬁca-
tion), processors and ripeners (maturing techniques and duration)
were acknowledged and enforced by decree. Second, as a result of a
reform of the INAO certiﬁcation process, all players in the PDO sup-
ply chain now have to be certiﬁed. Strengthened speciﬁcations and
compulsory certiﬁcation have led to a change in the status of farm-
ers, PDO organizations and local administrative agencies. They now
actively take part in the governance (management and exclusion
rules) of the designation. With the ﬁnancial support of the local
administration, an advertising campaign has been launched and
an information system to monitor volumes and levels of valoriza-
tion is gradually being implemented by the PDO organization. In
addition, the local administration has exerted political pressure
on the dairy ﬁrms to secure farmers’ access to a share of the repu-
tation beneﬁts: a premium on PDO milk sales roughly correspond-
ing to a 6% price increase has been negotiated. Third, to help PDO
farmers and processors to adapt their practices to the new speciﬁ-
cations, a speciﬁc innovation strategy has gradually been put in
place under the guidance of the PDO organization and with the
support of research and technical centers, testifying a diffusion of
the domestic conception of control towards the structure of gover-
nance proponent, so far, of an industrial conception of control.
Nevertheless, the empirical results show that the success of this
qualitative strategy is not guaranteed, with difﬁculties to transfer
price premiums downstream and a continuing concentration of
processing ﬁrms.
This analysis of the quality turn in the hybrid competition
regime suggests that changes in the value chain governance can
be speciﬁed through an analysis of the establishment of collective
choice rules. We also showed that the two resource systems (inno-
vation capacities and collective reputation) evolve jointly, and
together with the resource units (access to speciﬁc skills and mar-
ket premium, respectively). The creation of new rules generates
new resources and new statuses for market participants.
Conclusion
The present paper enhances the conceptual and empirical
understanding of market functioning and highlights the role of
market institutions in containing competition and stabilizing con-
ditions to access markets. It is an addition to existing work on food
supply chains and on the beneﬁts of labels and collective action for
securing farmers’ access to markets (Parrott et al., 2002; Hueth and
Marcoul, 2003; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Gerefﬁ et al., 2005;
Markelova et al., 2009; Crespi et al., 2012; Dentoni et al., 2012).
The competition regime approach we proposed is an opera-
tional framework for analyzing market functioning and spatio-
temporal dynamics. It makes it possible to articulate scales and
various types of coordination instruments: the evolution of
macro-structures, territorial or sectorial structures and public
and collective governance structures can be jointly analyzed. Com-
petition regimes are sustained by intangible property rights
regimes: rights and duties of market participants are determined
by the system of rules that manage the system of resources, which
are pooled together to stabilize markets. The social nature of com-
petitiveness is thus highlighted.
With this new framework, value creation and sharing processes
in supply chains can be approached both in their economic and
political dimensions. The empirical comparative analysis suggests
that the success of market segmentation strategies is conditioned
(i) by the speciﬁcity of the innovation system supporting them,
and (ii) by the collective capacity to adjust supply to demand
through a clear deﬁnition of market participants. We also have
M. Dervillé, G. Allaire / Food Policy 49 (2014) 347–360 359shown that the capability of ﬁrms (farms included) to beneﬁt from
such strategies depends on their ability to take part in the manage-
ment of the common-pool resource system.
This paper contributes to the understanding that changes of
nature in the policy instruments imply changes in their implemen-
tation scale. The quota system enabled large ‘‘economies of scale’’
for the farmers to negotiate their conditions to access markets, as
the main union, in partnership with the state, managed the innova-
tion process and the production rights at the national level. Innova-
tive capacities of the regional economic players mainly consisted of
an appropriation of the national coordination instruments. The end
of quotas and the subsequent contractual regulation is, on the con-
trary, demanding for the local innovative capacities, with dairy
farmers now dealing directly with their collectors. Nevertheless,
despite the opportunity provided by the Milk Package in 2012 to
develop large regional producer organizations, the organizations
created so far are mainly intra-ﬁrm and infra-departmental. As a
result, dairy farmers have a limited bargaining power to negotiate
prices or production orientation. The analysis suggests that, to
become effective market participants, farmers should cooperate
at large territorial scales and take part in the management of the
milk supply chain (volume and quality). To do that, farmers’ orga-
nizations would need material and immaterial investments and
assistance from regional public players to build new local collec-
tive capacities. From a policy point of view, to make farmers’ orga-
nizations effective market participants, a change in scale is
required to keep up with such a change in policy. The competition
regime framework is an asset for the design of such public supports
since the identiﬁcation of spatially differentiated market institu-
tions and collective capacities would facilitate the emergence of
new policies in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. We
show, for example, that more in-depth and long-term support
may be required to develop innovative capacities in the generic
competition regime. Finally, public players may contribute at sev-
eral scales to balancing the power relationships in the contractual
supply chains by establishing control over standards and enforcing
the participation of all market actors (farmers and their
organizations included) in the management of the related com-
mon-pool resources.
The present results call for more work on the role of common-
pool resources in market. One way to tackle it would be to develop
a genealogical approach of resources and institutions building. In
addition, the empirical evidence in terms of farmers’ bargaining
power relative to their participation in common-pool resources
management system could be enriched by a quantitative analysis
of the value addition and sharing processes along supply chains
(Bonnet and Bouamra-Mechemache, 2014).
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